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NOTES AND COMMENT
"It may be that the human agencies engaged in such benefi-
cent work will at times fall short of what would be expected
of men and women intrusted with a most serious and delicate
task, but that is a matter that concerns the due administration
of the laws, and may well be left to the vigilance of the people
and the conscience of officials."
Nevertheless, this is the method adopted by the Legislature, and
sanctioned as far as it goes by the leading criminologists of the day.2 1
It is the function of courts to interpret and apply the laws of the
state. The lower courts have been singularly free from technicalities.
They have been quick to grasp the intention of the Legislature, and
have striven to apply it. In People v. Thompson the Court of Appeals
construed the Parole Commission Law, but did it apply it? It found
the provisions of the law mandatory in those cities in which it applies,
and yet its decision indicates a policy which deviates from that finding.
The likely effect of this decision is to influence trial courts in future
applications of this statute towards an exercise of a discretion in
their pronouncement of sentence, which the Court of Appeals admits
was not in the contemplation of the Legislature. Yet this might well
be deemed to be authorized, from the fact that the Court of Appeals
itself, in this case, held the defendant incapable of reformation in the
face of the finding of the Trial Court in its second determination that
he was to be considered a proper subject for the reforming agencies
with which the Parole Commission Law is concerned. It is difficult
to reconcile its policy, as we must interpret it from this case, with its
dicta as to the mandatory functions of the law. It is still more difficult
to understand why the Court of Appeals, even indirectly, should pro-
duce a reactionary effect on the legislative measures passed for the
advancement and benefit of society as a whole.
ESTHER L. KOPPELMAN.
FELONY MURDER AND THE JONES LAW.
The recent enactment of Congress, popularly known as the Jones
Law,' which has assumed much prominence in the press and public
'See Barnes, The Repression of Crime; Tannenbaum Frank, Wall
Shadows.
1 Public No. 899-70th Congress (S. 2901). An act to amend the National
Prohibition Act. as amended and supplemented: "Be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress,
assembled, That wherever a penalty or penalties are prescribed in a criminal
prosecution by the National Prohibition Act, as amended and supplemented, for
the illegal manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, or exportation of
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discussion, presents a question of considerable interest in the field of
criminal law. Will it be murder in the first degree, under the felony
murder rule where a homicide is committed by one while in the viola-
tion of the Jones Law, even though the killing would be either
excusable homicide or manslaughter, were the violation of the federal
law not itself a felony?
Under the early common law a homicide committed while per-
petrating or in the attempt to perpetrate a felony was murder even
though there was no premeditation or intent to kill.2 The malicious-
ness and the unlawful nature of the felonious act was held to supply
the place of malice and intent to kill. Some of the authoritative cases
placed the restriction, however, that the felonious act must be an
act naturally dangerous to life and likely in itself to cause death.3 It
was also held that if the unlawful act was merely a misdemeanor and
not naturally resulting in death the homicide was manslaughter. 4 But
before one was held answerable, at common law, for an unintentional
homicide, in the very few cases that arose, the unlawful act must
have been malum in se as distinguished from acts mnalum prohibitum,
acts not in and of themselves wrong, merely prohibited by posi-
tive law.5
This substantially remains the law.0 Although most states have
passed statutes making homicides committed while perpetrating or
in the attempt to perpetrate a felony, murder in the first degree, many
states have restricted it to certain enumerated felonies which are,
generally, arson, rape, burglary, and robbery. In these states it is for
the most part held that if the felony is other than those enumerated
the homicide is murder in the second degree. As to unlawful acts
being malun prohibitum or nalum in se the distinction has rarely
been drawn, in this couniry, in cases of felony, such an act almost
always being an act mnlurm in se and the occasion to distinguish,
intoxicating liquor as defined by Section 1, Title II -of the National Prohibition
Act, the penalty imposed for each such offense shall be a fine not to exceed$10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed five years or both: Provided that it is
the intent of Congress that the Court, in imposing sentence hereunder, shall
discriminate between casual or slight violations and habitual sales of intoxicating
liquor, or attempts to commercialize violations of the law.
"Sec. 2. This Act shall not repeal nor eliminate any minimum penalty for
the first or any subsequent offense now provided by the said National Prohibi-
tion Act."
'Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox C. C. 311 (1887); Regina v. Greenwood, 7 Cox
C. C. 404 (1857); State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278 (1884); Regina v. Lee, 4
Fost. & F. 63 (1864) ; Queen v. Franz, 2 Fost. & F. 580 (1861) ; 1 Hawk. P. C.
127; 2 Hawk. P. C. 442; Barretts Case, Stephen's Digest of Crim. Law,
164, Art. 224; 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (11th ed. 1912), Sec. 445 et seq.;
4 B1. Comm. 200.
'Regina v. Serne, supra; 3 Chit. C. L. 725 et seq.
'Rex v. Wild, 2 Lew. C. C. 214; 3 Chit. C. L. 727, 729.
a1 Hale P. C. 38; ibid. 471, 476; Foster C. L. 258 et seq. 4 B1. Comm. 200;
3 Chit. C. L. 729; Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 19 Am. Rep.
362 (1873).
'3rd Dec. Dig. 973, et seq.
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therefore, never having arisen, except in a few cases.
The "felony murder" statutes in New York have undergone a
few changes. In 1860 7 the statutes provided that murder committed
in the perpetration or in the attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, rob-
bery, burglary or in the attempt to escape from prison, was first
degree murder. This was repealed in 1862 8 and arson remained the
only subject of felony murder. In 1873 9 the former statute was
amended to include all felonies. The present statute, Penal Law,
Section 1044 10 provides: "The killing of a human being, unless it is
excusable or justifiable, is murder in the first degree, when committed
* * * 2. * * * or without a design to effect death, by a person
engaged in the commission of, or in the attempt to commit a felony,
either upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise. * * *" This is
all-inclusive, so that the killing of a human being is murder in the
first degree, in this state, whenever done by a person engaged in the
commission of, or in the attempt to commit any felony, and it has
been so held."'
Prior to the enactment of the Jones Law in March of this year, a
first offender of the National Prohibition Act was guilty of a mis-
demeanor and a second or subsequent offender was guilty of felony.12
Under the Jones Law a more stringent penalty has been provided
for-even a first offender is guilty of a felony because since even he
may be punished by imprisonment of more than one year he comes
within the federal definition of a felony, which is: "all offenses
which may be punished by death or imprisonment for a term exceed-
ing one year shall be deemed felonies. All other offenses shall be
deemed misdemeanors." is
By the second section of the 18th Amendment, Congress and
the several states are given concurrent ' 4 power to enforce the Amend-
ment by appropriate legislation. By the terms of the Amendment
each state, as well as Congress, may enact such enforcing legislation
as they see fit.15 Breaches of the federal statutes become federal
offenses and violations of the state statutes become state offenses.1 6
Laws of 1860, c. 410.8 La,vs of 1862, c. 197.
9 Laws of 1873, c. 644.
1o Laws of 1909, c. 88.
' People v. Collins, 234 N. Y. 355, 137 N. E. 753 (1922) ; People v. Weiner,
248 N. Y. 118 (1928); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100 (1927); People v.
Sobieskoda, 235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923); Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y.
485, aff'd 6 Hun 493 (1876); People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520, 22 N. E.
180 (1889).
"Title II, National Prohibition Act, Sec. 29, 27 U. S. C. A., Sec. 46.
'Fed. Crim. Code, Sec. 335, 18 U. S. C. A., Sec. 541.
" For House debates on "concurrent power" in the Prohibition Amendment
see 58 Cong. Rec. 2512 (1919).
"It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that prosecution by both the state and the federal government for the same
act of manufacturing prohibited liquors does not constitute double jeopardy.
Hebert et aL. v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, L. ed. 270, 48 A. L. R. 1102 (1926).
" U. S. v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141, 67 L. ed. 314 (1922).
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By allowing the states to enforce by "appropriate legislation" does
not expressly require the passage of enforcing legislation. It merely
permits the state legislatures to pass enforcement laws not repugnant
to the Amendment. 17 In the year 1921 the Legislature of New York
passed an enforcement act known as the Mulligan-Gage Law,'8 which,
however, was repealed in 1923 by the Cuvillier Act.19
Since we have no prohibition statute on our books at this time
the question arises whether a felony against the Federal Government
would be construed in this state as a felony under our laws. The idea
that the word felony has a fixed and certain meaning is erroneous
because it has as many meanings as there are law-making bodies.20
Each sovereign state may give its own definition as to what shall con-
stitute a felony within its jurisdiction.21 New York has seen fit to
describe a felony as a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in
state's prison,2 2 and it has been frequently held 23 that the term
"felony" as used at common law and in statutes, with reference to the
killing of a human being without any design to effect death, by a
person engaged in the commission of any felony, means an offense
punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison. Conse-
quently, as violations of the prohibition laws are not punishable in
the manner provided for in our state definition of a felony, it is sub-
mitted that they are not state felonies. 24 Since New York's repeal of
its prohibition laws, it may be said that liquor violations are not
' Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676 (1879) ; U. S. v. Reese,
92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563 (1875).
"Laws of 1921, c. 155, 156.
"Laws of 1923, c. 871.
'Ex parte Humphrey, 64 Cal. App. 572, 222 Pac. 366 (1923).
' Ex parte Humphrey, supra. In U. S. v. Lanza, stpra Note 16, at 382, in
speaking of Federal and State Prohibition Laws the Court said: "Each govern-
ment in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is
exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other."
'N. Y. Penal Law (1909), See. 2.
Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 42 N. W. 243 (1889) ; State v. Hammond,
35 Wisc. 315 (1873); State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578 (1851);
Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 Am. Rep. 109 (1877); Weller v.
State, 19 Ohio C. C. 166 (1899); Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N. E. 607,
61 L. R. A. 277, 90 Am. St. Rep. 564 (1902). Cf. Bannon qt al. v. U. S., 156
U. S. 464, 39 L. ed. 494 (1895); ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 5 Sup. Ct.
935 (1885).
"In ex parte Humphrey, supra Note 20, the question arose whether under
the state prohibition statutes a second offender was guilty ,of felony or mis-
demeanor. The statute by reference adopts the penal provisions of Section 29
of the National Prohibition Act, which, although it provides for imprisonment
for more than one year, does not specify whether the.offense is a felony or a
misdemeanor. The Court held the offense to be a misdemeanor under the state
law, even though a felony under the federal law. It was pointed out that the
word "felony" under the federal law means something different from the
meaning given to it by the state law. Under the federal law the term of
imprisonment the Court may impose governs, whereas under the state law the
place of imprisonment-state's prison-determines the character of the offense.
The Court therefore refused to adopt the federal classification of crimes.
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criminal 25 against the state sovereignty other than by virtue of the
state's duty to uphold constitutional amendments and federal laws. 26
Penal Law, Sec. 22, N. Y. Laws, 1909, Ch. 88, which provides, "No
act or omission begun after the beginning of the day of which this
chapter takes effect as a law, shall be deemed criminal or punishable,
except as prescribed or authorized by this chapter, or by some statute
of this state not repealed by it," lends much weight to this view.
It is concluded, therefore, that from a literal and sound con-
struction of the cited statutes felony murder under the Jones Law
cannot arise in New York. Assuming that we had a state prohibition
law in force which by its provisions made a violation of it a felony,
an interesting question arises as to whether our courts would hold a
violator of such state law, who committed a homicide while in its
perpetration, guilty of felony murder.
A very interesting case 27 which may aid us in our discussion was
decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan in 1924. Defendant was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter and brought his case to this
court for review on exceptions. Defendant was engaged in the busi-
ness of manufacturing and selling "moonshine" whiskey. After ex-
cessively drinking liquor furnished by defendant, deceased and his
companions started walking home. This occurrence was in the month
of February, and the weather was extremely cold. Doctors testified
that the death was caused by acute alcoholism and exposure to the
cold, deceased no doubt in a drunken stupor having fallen asleep on
his journey home. Defendant argued that selling intoxicating liquor
was a felony 28 and since where death results from the commission of
a felony the homicide is not manslaughter but murder, he was im-
properly convicted of manslaughter. Holding him not guilty of homi-
cide in any degree, the Court nevertheless took occasion to point out
its complete disagreement with defendant's argument with respect to
the degree of his crime, pointing out that violation of liquor laws is
not inherently criminal, only criminal because prohibited by statute.
In other words, the act was merely nalum prohibitum and not malum
in se.29 The Court said:
"* * * notwithstanding the fact that the statute has de-
dared it to be a felony, it is an act not in itself directly and
'A new aspect to the liquor question has arisen in New York with respect
to the prosecution of certain liquor violations under a state penal statute in
reference to nuisances, but that question is not germane to the discussion at hand.
-U. S. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2; Atwell's Fed. Grim. Law, 2nd ed.,
Sec. 1, 37.
People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N. W. 373 (1924).
Mich. Comp. Laws (Cahill, 1915 and Supp. 1922), Sec. 7079, makes prac-
tically al" violations of the state prohibition statutes felonies.
' But see State v. Keever, 177 N. C. 114, 97 S. E. 727 (1919).
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naturally dangerous to life.30 So if one in the commission of
such an act unintentionally causes the death of another he is
not guilty of murder, nor is he guilty of manslaughter unless
he commits the act carelessly and in such a manner as manifests
a reckless disregard of human life."
It is further stated, in this opinion, that if the liquor furnished
by defendant were dangerous for use as a beverage of greater
potency than ordinary whiskey, or if it contained poisonous ingredi-
ents, the defendant, having distilled it himself, would be charged with
a knowledge of its dangerous character and would be guilty of
involuntary manslaughter.
It must be noticed, however, that Michigan's definition of first
degree murder is not similar to ours.31 It reads as follows: "* * * all
murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying-in-
wait or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing
or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpe-
trate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder
of the first degree. * * *" This provision is similar to the provision
of the federal criminal code 32 and quite similar to the provision of
our state statute of 1860.33 Although the Michigan statutes make no
provision for homicide committed while perpetrating felonies other
than those enumerated, it appears from a reading of the cases that the
common law in reference to felony murder still obtains in that state.
The common law in this particular case, as previously indicated,
appears to be that an unintended homicide committed by one who at
the time is engaged in the commission of a felony is murder if the
homicide is the ordinary and probable effect of the felony in which
the criminal was engaged.3 4 Therefore we can plainly understand the
reason for the decision. Although the act of furnishing the prohibited
liquor was a felony still the act is not a probable cause of homicide.
The common law as regards involuntary manslaughter still prevails
in Michigan. It is, in part, defined as the unintentional killing of
another without malice while doing an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or in negligently
doing some lawful act.35 And by the weight of authority where the
' In this connection see People v. Olsen, 80 Cal. 122, 22 Pac. 125 (1889) ;
Lamb v. People, 96 Ill. 73 (1880) ; Regina v. Serne, supra Note 2; State v.
Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361, 25 Am. Dec. 490 (1833); Cunningham v. People, 195
Ill. 550, 63 N. E. 517 (1902) ; Nutt v. State, 63 Ala. 180 (1879) ; 63 L. R. A.
354, note.
'Mich. Comp. Laws (Cahill, 1915), See. 15192.
Fed. Crim. Code, Sec. 273; R. S. Sec. 5339, 18 U. S. C. A., Sec. 452.
Sufpra Note 7.
" People v. Harris, 214 Mich. 145, 182 N. W. 673, 16 A. L. R. 910 (1921);
People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400 (1911); People v. Ryczek, 224
Mich. 106, 194 N. W. 609 (1923) and cases therein cited; supra Note 2; State
v. Reitze, 86 N. J. L. 407, 92 Atl. 576 (1914).
'Wharton, Homicide (3rd ed.) 8; People v. Harris, supra Note 34.
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question has arisen, if the unlawful act is merely nialun prohibitum
and not nmlumn in se the act, before one is answerable for the homi-
cide, must be in its nature dangerous to life or it must manifest an
evil nature or wrongful disposition to harm or injure another in his
person or property.36 It was under the latter doctrine that the Pavlic
case 37 was decided.38
The "felony murder" rule as applied to those cases in which the
felony is arson, rape, burglary, robbery, or other grievous crimes,
where the felonious act displays a wickedness of heart or a general
disregard for others, is sound beyond doubt; but where, as under the
Jones Law, the offense is nwlum prohibitum only, in the absence of
controlling statutes, the rule founded upon reason and justice, and not
without authority, should be, if the result of the felony is homicide:
1. The killing will be murder, where the natural and probable
consequence of the felony is death; 2. manslaughter, if the unlawful
act is done negligently or in a wanton disregard for the life of others
and the unlawful act is not a probable consequence of death; 3. neither
murder nor manslaughter if the unlawful act is not done wantonly or
negligently and if the homicide is not the natural consequence of the
unlawful act.
Since as we have already seen,3 9 a homicide resulting from the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any felony is statutory murder
in New York, it follows that if violations or prohibition laws were
made felonious by our penal laws, the resulting death would be held
to be murder in the first degree. This would be mandatory and not
subject to the judicial refinements found in the common law.
EDWARD J. DONLON.
2 People v. Barnes, supra Note 34, and cases therein cited; Thiede v. State,
infra Note 38, and cases therein cited. See also .Sparks v. Commonwealth, 3
Bush (Ky.) 111, 96 Am. Dec. 196 (1867); Brittain v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R.
406, 37 S. W. 758 (1896) ; Silver v. State, 13 Ga. App. 722, 79 S. E. 919 (1913) ;
State v. De Fonti, 34 R. I. 51, 82 At. 722 (1912) ; State v. Keever, supra Note
29; Commonwealth v. Adams, supra Note 5; Estelle v. State, 51 N. J. L. 182,
17 AtI. 118 (1888) ; State v. Reitze, supra Note 34.
7 Supra Note 27.
'In Thiede v. State, 106 Neb. 48, 182 N. W. 570 (1921) the Court said:
"* * * that since the act of defendant was wrong only because prohibited it is
an act mnaurm prohibitunt, and where in the perpetration of such an act death
results, the law will not convert the act, innocently done and done with no intent
to injure and with no disregard for the safety of another, into a criminal act
and pronounce the act manslaughter. On the other hand, where the act is
unlawful is malumn prohibitum merely, but is accompanied by negligence and, in
its performance, the safety of others is recklessly disregarded, it is held
sufficient to supply the place of intent."
" Supra Note 11.
